1. Architecture Review
Is your agent isolated, auditable, and governed?
The rush to deploy agentic AI in security operations creates a new attack surface. Without intentional architecture design, adversarial testing, and deployment discipline, autonomous agents become amplifiers of risk, not reducers of it.
Organizations that move through all three survive the next 18 months with their agent as a genuine force multiplier. Those that skip steps will end up explaining their AI's decisions to their board and incident response counsel.
Is your agent isolated, auditable, and governed?
Can you break it? Will it fail gracefully?
Do you have human control? Can you kill it instantly?
This framework is free. Use it. Test your agent against it before it touches production.
Before your agent touches any control, answer these questions. If you cannot confidently answer Yes, your architecture has a gap.
| Checkpoint | Decision | If No, This Creates Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Isolation | Network-isolated, credential-isolated sandbox? | Lateral movement. Credential theft. Cascading compromise. |
| Permission | Can you list exactly what APIs the agent can touch? Minimum required? | Over-privileged agent. Unauthorized data access. Audit failure. |
| Kill Switch | Single, human-executable command to disable instantly? | Runaway agent. Uncontrollable decisions. Reputational damage. |
| Audit Trail | Every decision logged (timestamp, input, reasoning, action)? | Forensic blindness. Investigation failure. Compliance violation. |
| Escalation | Decisions above threshold require human approval first? | Autonomous bad decisions. No override. Board liability. |
| Rollback | Can you restore environment to known good state if agent causes damage? | Unrecoverable compromise. Extended downtime. Slow recovery. |
Red-team your agent before production. Run these scenarios. Document results.
| Test Scenario | What You're Checking | Pass Criteria |
|---|---|---|
| Poisoned Data | Can a compromised data source trick the agent into bad decisions? | Agent rejects or escalates. No unvalidated execution. |
| Hallucination | Does the agent invent data or actions that do not exist? | Acknowledges uncertainty. Escalates. Does not assume. |
| Privilege Escalation | Can the agent use valid credentials to access beyond scope? | Access denied or logged. Agent stays in boundary. |
| Graceful Failure | When APIs fail or the decision tree breaks, does it fail safely? | Pauses, logs error, escalates. Does NOT proceed blindly. |
| Audit Visibility | Can you reconstruct every decision from the last 24 hours? | Full chain visible in logs. Complete decision history. |
| Override Speed | How fast can a human stop the agent if it starts failing? | Kill switch under 30 seconds. Agent stops immediately. |
Earn autonomy in stages. Each phase expands the agent's authority only after the previous phase proves control.
Agent detects, humans execute.
Agent handles enrichment and triage.
Agent makes bounded decisions with human escalation.
Only after 30 days of zero escalations in Phase 3.